On the reality of cognitive illusions
On the reality of cognitive illusions
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DOI：
10.1037/0033-295x.103.3.582
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发表时间：
1996-07-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Tversky, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kahneman, D;Tversky, A
G. Gigerenzer在一些出版物中批评了对判断中的启发式和偏见的研究，他认为“偏见不是偏见”和“启发式是为了解释不存在的东西”（1991年第102页）。本文回应了Gigerenzer的批评，并表明它歪曲了作者的理论立场，忽视了关键的证据。与吉格伦泽的核心经验主义主张相反，对频率的判断——不仅仅是主观概率——容易受到大而系统的偏见的影响。对Gigerenzer（1996）的答复的附言。
The study of heuristics and biases in judgment has been criticized in several publications by G. Gigerenzer, who argues that ''biases are not biases'' and ''heuristics are meant to explain what does not exist'' (1991 p. 102). This article responds to Gigerenzer's critique and shows that it misrepresents the authors' theoretical position and ignores critical evidence. Contrary to Gigerenzer's central empirical claim, judgments of frequency-not only subjective probabilities-are susceptible to large and systematic biases. A postscript responds to Gigerenzer's (1996) reply.