Car Notches: Strategic Automaker Responses to Fuel Economy Policy
Car Notches: Strategic Automaker Responses to Fuel Economy Policy
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.06.005
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发表时间：
2010-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Sallee;J. Slemrod
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Sallee;J. Slemrod
缺口--行为的边际变化导致税收或补贴的离散变化--在许多政策中占据突出地位。在本文中，我们分析了燃油经济性政策的缺口，旨在减少与燃油消耗相关的负外部性。我们提供的证据表明，汽车制造商通过精确操纵燃油经济性评级，以获得更优惠的待遇，从而对高油耗税和强制性燃油经济性标签中的缺口做出反应。然后，我们描述了这种行为的福利后果，并得出适用于许多情况下的福利汇总统计。简而言之，缺口是平滑政策的低效替代品，因为它们创造了决策者之间差异很大的边际激励，并引发了一些具有负面净社会效益的个人行动。
Notches – where marginal changes in behavior lead to discrete changes in a tax or subsidy – figure prominently in many policies. In this paper, we analyze notches in fuel economy policies, which aim to reduce negative externalities associated with fuel consumption. We provide evidence that automakers respond to notches in the Gas Guzzler Tax and mandatory fuel economy labels by precisely manipulating fuel economy ratings so as to just qualify for more favorable treatment. We then describe the welfare consequences of this behavior and derive a welfare summary statistic applicable to many contexts. In brief, notches are an inefficient substitute for smooth policies because they create marginal incentives that vary among decision makers and induce some individual actions that have negative net social benefits.