Is International Emissions Trading Always Beneficial?
Is International Emissions Trading Always Beneficial?
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DOI：
10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol25-no2-2
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发表时间：
2004-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Babiker;J. Reilly;L. Viguier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Babiker;J. Reilly;L. Viguier
经济效率是京都议定书下国际排放贸易的一个主要论点。我们表明，许可证交易可以减少福利的国家，即使私人贸易方受益。其结果是Bhagwati意义上的“贫困化”增长，即贸易条件和税收相互作用的负面效应抵消了贸易收益。模拟和福利分解结果的基础上的CGE模型的全球经济表明，在欧盟范围内的贸易国家的净许可证卖方普遍失去，主要是由于存在扭曲的能源税。
Economic efficiency is a major argument for international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol. We show that permit trading can be welfare decreasing for countries, even though private trading parties benefit. The result is a case of “immiserizing” growth in the sense of Bhagwati where the negative terms of trade and tax interaction effects wipe out the gains from trading. Simulation and welfare decomposition results based on a CGE model of the global economy show that under EU-wide trading countries that are net permit sellers generally lose, due primarily to the existence of distortionary energy taxes.