The Myth of the Patient Japanese: Corporate Myopia and Financial Distress in Japan and the Us
The Myth of the Patient Japanese: Corporate Myopia and Financial Distress in Japan and the Us
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日本病人的神话：日本和美国的企业短视和财务困境
DOI：
10.3386/w5818
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
David E. Weinstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Hall;David E. Weinstein
人们普遍认为，以股市为导向的美国金融体系迫使企业管理者的行为相对于日本管理者而言是短视的，后者在以银行为基础的体系中运作。我们假设，如果美国公司比日本公司更短视，那么财务困境(短视最明显的时候)应该会导致美国公司比日本公司更多地减少研发支出(我们代表长期投资的主要指标)。我们没有发现任何证据表明情况就是这样。此外，我们还发现，在危机开始后，日本公司的投资并不比美国公司多。即使将美国公司与日本银行的金融联系进行比较，并被认为是最不短视的(也是最有能力经受住困境的)，我们的结果仍然站得住脚。结果还经受住了各种稳健性检查。我们发现，美国和日本企业对财务困境的反应相似，这让人们对美国经理人比日本经理人更短视的观点产生了怀疑。
It is widely believed that the stock-market oriented US financial system forces corporate managers to behave myopically relative to their Japanese counterparts, who operate in a bank-based system. We hypothesize that if US firms are more myopic than Japanese firms, then episodes of financial distress (when myopia should be most pronounced) should cause US firms to decrease their R&D spending (our main proxy for long-term investment) more than Japanese firms. We find no evidence that this is the case. In addition, we show that Japanese firms do not invest more than US firms after the onset of distress. Our results hold up even when US firms are compared to Japanese financial ties to their banks and are thought to be the least myopic (and the most able to weather distress). The results also withstand a variety of robustness checks. Our findings that US and Japanese firms respond similarly to financial distress cast doubt on the view that US managers are more short-sighted than their Japanese counterparts.