Multiple large shareholders and corporate investment: Evidence from China
Multiple large shareholders and corporate investment: Evidence from China
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多个大股东与企业投资：来自中国的证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.02.001
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发表时间：
2018-06-01
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Zhu, Bing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jiang, Fuxiu;Cai, Wenjing;Zhu, Bing
本研究探讨多个大股东在公司投资决策中的治理作用。本文以1640家在上海和深圳上市的中国公司为样本，比较了大股东持股公司与单一大股东持股公司的投资效率，发现大股东持股公司的存在和影响力显著提高了投资效率。在我们解决了内分泌和样本选择问题后，结果是稳健的。进一步的检验表明，MLS主要通过“声音”来实施治理。“MLS倾向于降低潜在的过度投资，提高未来的投资业绩。MLS对投资效率的影响并不随公司获得资源的情况而变化，并且在治理较强和信息不对称较少的公司中不太突出。我们的研究结果意味着，MLS发挥治理作用，减轻企业的代理成本和信息不对称，体现在企业的投资效率。(C)2018爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
This study investigates the governance role of multiple large shareholders (MLS hereafter) in firms' investment decisions. Using a sample of 1640 Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock markets, we compare the investment efficiency of firms having MLS with that of firms having a single large shareholder and find that the presence and power of MLS are associated with significantly higher investment efficiency. The results are robust after we address endogeneity and sample selection concerns. Further tests show that MLS exert governance mainly through "voice." MLS tend to lower potential overinvestment and increase future investment performance. The impact of MLS on investment efficiency does not vary with a firm's access to resources and is less prominent in firms with stronger governance and less information asymmetry. Our results imply that MLS play a governance role and alleviate a firm's agency costs and information asymmetry manifested in a firm's investment efficiency. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.