National culture and corporate investment
National culture and corporate investment
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DOI：
10.1057/jibs.2013.26
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发表时间：
2013-09
影响因子：
11.6
通讯作者：
L. Shao;C. Kwok;Ran Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Shao;C. Kwok;Ran Zhang
我们探讨个人主义和视野和类型的公司投资之间的关系，基于个人主义的风险承担的影响。我们发现，在个人主义国家的公司投资于长期（风险）比短期（安全）资产。此外，个人主义对长期投资的影响取决于R&D：个人主义国家的公司更多地投资于R&D项目，但不是更多地投资于实物资产。为了检验冒险是否是个人主义发挥作用的渠道，我们采用了两阶段普通最小二乘法和其他分析来否定其他解释，例如：（1）不受控制的制度决定了个人主义和R&D;（2）个人主义国家的公司在R&D上投资更多，因为他们有更高的投资效率，或者选择风险较小的R&D项目。我们进一步发现，个人主义的公司倾向于使用多余的现金来增加研发，而不是增加股息，和R&D决策是不太依赖于内部融资，但更敏感的增长机会，在个人主义的国家。
We explore the relation between individualism and horizons and types of corporate investment, based on individualism’s implications for risk taking. We find that firms in individualistic countries invest more in long-term (risky) than in short-term (safe) assets. Moreover, the effect of individualism on long-term investment hinges on R&D: firms in individualistic countries invest more in R&D projects but not more in physical assets. To test whether risk taking is the channel through which individualism works, we employ two-stage ordinary least squares and other analyses to nullify alternative explanations, such as: (1) uncontrolled institutions determine both individualism and R&D; and (2) firms in individualistic countries invest more in R&D because they have higher investment efficiency, or pick less-risky R&D projects. We further find that individualistic firms tend to employ excess cash to increase R&D rather than increase dividends, and R&D decisions are less reliant on internal financing but more responsive to growth opportunities in individualistic countries.