Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis
Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis
复制标题
查尔斯·戴斯 (Charles A. Dice) 金融经济研究中心 银行首席执行官激励与信贷危机
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
René M. Stulz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach;René M. Stulz
我们调查了银行在最近的信贷危机中的表现是否与危机前首席执行官（CEO）的激励有关。我们发现一些证据表明，ceo的激励与股东利益更一致的银行表现更差，但没有证据表明他们的表现更好。那些期权薪酬较高、ceo现金奖金占薪酬比例较大的银行，在危机期间的表现并没有变差。银行首席执行官们并没有在预期危机或危机期间减持股票。因此，他们在危机之后遭受了巨大的财富损失。
We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.