Trust in Procurement Interactions
Trust in Procurement Interactions
复制标题
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.2018.3196
复制
发表时间：
2019-09
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nicolas Fugger;Elena Katok;A. Wambach
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nicolas Fugger;Elena Katok;A. Wambach
我们调查了采购中的拍卖对买卖关系不利的说法，这表现为采购后买方的信任减少，供应商的优化行为增加。为了做到这一点，我们比较了标准拍卖和买家决定的拍卖。事实证明，由买家决定的拍卖会导致更高的价格，但会使买家和选定的供应商之间进行合作。在买方决定的拍卖中，买方选择较大的出价可能是最优的。另一方面，标准拍卖会产生较低的价格，但会将合作减少到最低限度。有趣的是，在买方确定的拍卖中，交易数量较多所反映的信任程度和交易效率要高得多。基于他人偏好的理论推理有助于组织结果。
We investigate the claim that auctions in procurement are detrimental to the buyer- seller relationship, which is expressed by less trust by the buyer and more oppor- tunistic behavior by the supplier after the sourcing. To do so, we compare exper- imentally a standard auction and a buyer-determined auction. It turns out that buyer-determined auctions result in higher prices but enable cooperation between the buyer and the selected supplier. In the buyer-determined auction it can be optimal for the buyer to choose the larger offer. The standard auctions, on the other hand, yield lower prices but reduce cooperation to a minimum. Interest- ingly the degree of trust reflected by a larger number of trades and efficiency in case of trade are significantly higher in the buyer-determined auction. Theoretical reasoning based on other-regarding preferences helps to organize the results.