Strategic Firm Interaction, Returns to Scale, Environmental Regulation and Ambient Charges in a Cournot Duopoly

Strategic Firm Interaction, Returns to Scale, Environmental Regulation and Ambient Charges in a Cournot Duopoly
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古诺双寡头垄断中的战略性企业互动、规模回报、环境监管和环境费用

DOI：
10.4236/ti.2013.42014
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
Technology and Investment
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Subhadra Ganguli
Subhadra Ganguli
中科院分区：
--
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Raju;Subhadra Ganguli

文献摘要

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条件下的环境监管 非点源污染下的不完全竞争 在文献中没有得到很好的分析。本文建立了战略企业模型 环境电荷的相互作用及其对大气总污染的影响 不完全竞争，古诺型双寡头在常数和递减条件下 规模收益（CRTS和DRTS）。我们确定了两个 明显的而且经常是相反的效果。在CRTS下， 环境收费是为了减少污染（从而减少污染） 而次要的影响是降低输出。减少污染， 较低的输出相互加强，使得较高的环境电荷导致 明确减少污染。在DRTS下，较高的环境电荷 减少产量，但对减排的影响是模糊的。而且 在CRTS下，环境电荷变化的边际效应大于 DRTS。我们的研究结果表明，在一般情况下，污染控制机制， 因为环境电荷在CRTS下趋于更有效。
Environmental regulation under conditions of imperfect competition in the presence of nonpoint sources (NPS) of pollution has not been well analyzed in the literature. This paper models strategic firm interaction and the effect of ambient charges on total NPS pollution in an imperfectly competitive, Cournot type duopoly under constant and decreasing returns to scale (CRTS & DRTS). We identify two distinct and often opposing effects. Under CRTS, the primary effect of a higher ambient charge is to increase pollution abatement (and thus decrease pollution) while the secondary effect is to lower output. Higher pollution abatement and lower output reinforce each other so that a higher ambient charge results in an unambiguous decrease in NPS pollution. Under DRTS, a higher ambient charge decreases output but the effect on abatement is ambiguous. Moreover, the marginal effect of a change in the ambient charge is larger under CRTS than DRTS. Our results indicate that, in general, pollution control mechanisms such as ambient charges tend to be more effective under CRTS.