Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity
Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity
复制标题
激励合同和全要素生产率
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00405.x
复制
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Demougin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Bental;D. Demougin
本文提出了全要素生产率的交易成本理论。在一个信息不对称和交易成本不对称的世界里，必须通过激励机制来提高生产率。劳动合同权衡了边际收益和努力成本。除了工人努力的边际负效用外，后者还包括组织成本和租金。随着经济的增长，契约会发生内生变化，导致更高的努力和生产率。交易成本还受到决定激励力度的社会特征的影响。这些特征的差异可以解释跨经济体生产率的差异。数值实验证明了该模型与时间序列和跨国观测的一致性。
We propose a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity (TFP). In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, productivity must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off marginal benefits and costs of effort. The latter include, in addition to the workers' marginal disutility of effort, organizational costs and rents. As the economy grows, contracts change endogenously, inducing higher effort and productivity. Transactions costs are also affected by societal characteristics that determine the power of incentives. Differences in these characteristics may explain cross-economy productivity differences. Numerical experiments demonstrate the model's consistency with time-series and cross-country observations.