Equality, complementarity and the incidence of public expenditures
Equality, complementarity and the incidence of public expenditures
复制标题
平等、互补和公共支出的发生率
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(76)90050-5
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发表时间：
1976
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Bruno
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Bruno
本文试图以多种方式扩展关于公共支出公平和效率的阿罗功利主义模型。它展示了原则上如何根据投入和个体属性之间的潜在相互作用以及所应用的假定规范政策来定量解释观察到的公共支出分布。给出的例子表明，积极的投入互动会导致回归分配结果，即使基本政策是平等的，但还不够。最后，该模型被扩展到累进所得税和多种政府投入的情况。
The paper attempts to extend the Arrow utilitarian model on equity and efficiency of public expenditures in a number of ways. It is shown how one could, in principle, interpret an observed distribution of a public expenditure quantitatively in terms of the underlying interaction between the input and the individual attributes and the postulated normative policies applied. Examples are given of positive input interaction leading to regressive distributional outcomes, even if the underlying policy is egalitarian but not sufficiently so. Finally, the model is extended to the case of a progressive income tax and that of multiple government inputs.