Strategic Exploration: Pre-emption and Prioritization
Strategic Exploration: Pre-emption and Prioritization
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战略探索：先发制人和优先顺序
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdad084
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
Wong, Yu Fu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Liu, Qingmin;Wong, Yu Fu
本文分析了一种战略探索模型，在该模型中，竞争对手独立地探索一组备选方案。该模型以多人多臂土匪问题为特色，并捕捉到了先占--对手未来将探索的替代方案的秘密探索--和最有希望的替代方案的优先顺序--之间的战略权衡。我们的结果解释了战略权衡如何塑造均衡行为和结果，例如，在超级大国之间的技术竞赛和企业之间的研发竞争中。我们表明，玩家在同一组替代方案上竞争，导致从头到尾的重复探索，他们在更有希望的替代方案耗尽之前，探索先验上不太有希望的替代方案。该模型还预测，竞争会诱使参与者过早地实现不可靠的技术，即使他们应该等待技术成熟。即使替代方案同样有希望，协调勘探也是不可能的，但如果有一个很短的最后期限，在先发制人的竞争阶段之后，它可以在平衡中出现。在探索能力不对称的情况下，弱者进行广泛的探索，而不是紧张的探索--探索与强者一样多的选择，但永远不会完全探索任何选择。
This paper analyses a model of strategic exploration in which competing players independently explore a set of alternatives. The model features a multiple-player multiple-armed bandit problem and captures a strategic trade-off betweenpre-emption—covert exploration of alternatives that the opponent will explore in the future—andprioritization—exploration of the most promising alternatives. Our results explain how the strategic trade-off shapes equilibrium behaviours and outcomes, for example, in technology races between superpowers and R&D competitions between firms. We show that players compete on the same set of alternatives, leading to duplicated exploration from start to finish, and they explore alternatives that are a priori less promising before more promising ones are exhausted. The model also predicts that competition induces players to implement unreliable technologies too early, even though they should wait for the technologies to mature. Coordinated exploration is impossible even if the alternatives are equally promising, but it can emerge in equilibrium following a phase of pre-emptive competition if there is a short deadline. With asymmetric capacities of exploration, the weak player conductsextensiveinstead ofintensiveexploration—exploring as many alternatives as the strong player does but never fully exploring any.