Integration, Complementary Products and Variety
Integration, Complementary Products and Variety
复制标题
集成、互补产品和多样性
DOI：
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00651.x
复制
发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Neil Gandal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Church;Neil Gandal
本文探讨了当耐用消费品（硬件）市场是寡头垄断和补充服务（软件）市场是垄断竞争时，整合的动机。我们发现，均衡的产业结构将取决于软件开发的固定成本的大小。如果软件开发成本相对较大，则均衡产业结构是非一体化的，即硬件厂商都不一体化;如果软件开发成本相对较小，则均衡产业结构是一体化的，即硬件厂商都一体化。在一体化的产业结构下，五金利润较低，提供的品种较少，五金价格低于非一体化的产业结构。由于止赎效应，当软件开发成本相对较低时，游戏具有囚徒困境结构。战略性地增加软件种类的数量为集成硬件公司提供了一条途径，通过减少非集成竞争技术的软件种类来增加其市场份额和利润。虽然在一体化产业结构下消费者剩余较高，但非一体化产业结构下的总剩余超过一体化产业结构下的总剩余。
This paper examines the incentives for integration when the market for consumer durables (hardware) is oligopolistic and the market for complementary services (software) is monopolistically competitive. We find that the equilibrium industry structure will depend on the magnitude of the fixed costs of software development. If the software development costs are relatively large, the equilibrium industry structure is unintegrated, that is, neither hardware firm integrates; if the software development costs are relatively small, the equilibrium industry structure is integrated, that is, both hardware firms integrate. Under the integrated industry structure, hardware profits are lower, less varieties are provided, and hardware prices are lower than under the unintegrated industry structure. The game has a prisoners' dilemma structure when the software development costs are relatively small because of a foreclosure effect. Strategically increasing the number of software varieties provides an avenue for an integrated hardware firm to increase its market share and profits by reducing the number of software varieties available for an unintegrated rival technology. Although consumer surplus is higher under an integrated industry structure, the total surplus associated with the unintegrated industry structure exceeds that of the integrated industry structure.