XI. Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency1
XI. Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency1
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十一.
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发表时间：
2003
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通讯作者：
K. Jones
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作者：
K. Jones
对情绪的经验研究和普通观察告诉我们，我们的情绪有时会让我们意识到存在真实的重要的理性思考，而不一定会以一种易受意识表达影响的方式向我们呈现这些信息，有时，即使我们有意识地持有和内在地合理判断，情况不包含这样的理由。在这篇论文中，我想探讨的事实是，情绪表现出不同程度的整合与我们的有意识的机构，从根本没有到相当实质性的，我们对我们的理性的理解，特别是传统的假设，意志薄弱必然是非理性的。
Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of integration with our conscious agency—from none at all to quite substantial—for our understanding of our rationality, and in particular for the traditional assumption that weakness of the will is necessarily irrational.