The reinforcement heuristic in normal form games

The reinforcement heuristic in normal form games
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DOI:
10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.014
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发表时间:
2018-08-01
影响因子:
2.2
通讯作者:
Ritschel, Alexander
Ritschel, Alexander
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Alos-Ferrer, Carlos;Ritschel, Alexander

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我们通过选择数据和反应时间分析了3x3游戏中基于强化的简单行为规则。我们认为,在基于强化的启发式(赢-留,输-换)和更“理性”的短视最佳回应行为规则之间存在很大的重叠。然而,响应时间的证据表明,与这些规则的共同处方相一致的选择相对较快,而“失去-转移”形式的选择在与过去收益差异较大的情况下出现得更频繁。这两项观察都支持强化过程作为明显近视最佳反应的认知捷径,并建议在解释行为结果时要谨慎,以支持优化行为。(C) 2018 Elsevier B.V.版权所有
We analyze simple reinforcement-based behavioral rules in 3 x 3 games through choice data and response times. We argue that there is a large overlap between reinforcement-based heuristics (win-stay, lose-shift) and the more "rational" behavioral rule of myopic best reply. However, evidence from response times shows that choices in agreement with the common prescription of those rules are comparatively fast, and choices of the form "lose-shift" occur more frequently for larger differences with bygone payoffs. Both observations speak in favor of reinforcement processes as a cognitive shortcut for apparent myopic best reply, and advise caution when interpreting behavioral results in favor of optimizing behavior. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.