Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access

Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access
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宽带接入的垂直封锁

DOI:
10.1111/1467-6451.00151
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发表时间:
2003
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
Hal J. Singer
Hal J. Singer
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
D. Rubinfeld;Hal J. Singer

文献摘要

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美国在线和时代华纳的合并涉及最大的互联网内容提供商和聚合器与一家大型有线电视系统运营商的垂直组合,后者提供了一条管道,宽带客户可以通过该管道高速访问互联网内容。我们认为,这种公司采取两种不同的垂直止赎策略的经济动机是:(1)管道歧视--通过限制竞争对手平台分发其附属内容和服务,使自己的渠道免受竞争;(2)内容歧视--通过阻止或降低外部内容的质量,使其附属内容免受竞争。
The merger of AOL and Time Warner involved a vertical combination of the largest Internet content provider and aggregator and a large cable system operator which offers a conduit through which broadband customers can access Internet content at high speeds. We consider the economic incentives of such a firm to engage in two distinct vertical foreclosure strategies: (1) conduit discrimination—insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting rival platform distribution of its affiliated content and services, and (2) content discrimination—insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content.