Comparison of Alternative Payment Mechanisms for French Treasury Auctions
Comparison of Alternative Payment Mechanisms for French Treasury Auctions
复制标题
法国国债拍卖替代支付机制比较
DOI：
10.2307/27917386
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发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Erwann Sbai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Olivier Armantier;Erwann Sbai
世界各地的国债拍卖通常是在统一价格或歧视性格式下进行的。我们提出了替代的支付机制，包括作为特例的统一价格和歧视性格式。我们比较这些替代格式的具体情况下，法国国债拍卖的属性。我们的研究结果表明，一种新的支付机制，命名为“第k平均价格”拍卖，占主导地位的所有其他格式的收入，它将提高法国财政部。然而，人们发现，所谓的“西班牙拍卖”从一个拍卖到下一个拍卖产生最稳定的收入流。
Treasury auctions around the world have been typically conducted under either the uniform-price or discriminatory format. We propose alternative payment mechanisms including the uniform-price and discriminatory formats as special cases. We compare the properties of these alternative formats in the specific context of French Treasury auctions. Our results indicate that a new payment mechanism, named the "kth-average-price" auction, dominates all other formats in terms of the revenues it would raise for the French Treasury. The so-called "Spanish auction" however, is found to generate the most stable stream of revenues from one auction to the next.