The OECD Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition And Two-Way Capital Flows

The OECD Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition And Two-Way Capital Flows
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经合组织税收协定范本:税收竞争和双向资本流动

DOI:
10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00087
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发表时间:
2003
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
Ronald B. Davies
Ronald B. Davies
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ronald B. Davies

文献摘要

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税务示范条约不要求协调税率,但要求对汇回的收入实行抵免或免税。这与最近的单一资本输出国模型相矛盾,在单一资本输出国,扣除是最有效的。我将资本流动通常是双边的这一事实纳入其中。在对称国家中,双方的信贷是唯一有效的条约均衡。这种均衡弱地支配着无条约均衡。对于不对称国家,如果不进行税收协调,条约就不需要作出改进。通过协调,只有在两国都不使用扣减的情况下,才始终有可能实现有效的资本分配,同时增加两国的福利。2003年宾夕法尼亚大学经济学系和大坂大学社会经济研究协会研究所版权所有。
Model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination, but do require that either credits or exemptions be applied to repatriated earnings. This contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where deductions are most efficient. I incorporate the fact that capital flows are typically bilateral. With symmetric countries, credits by both is the unique and efficient treaty equilibrium. This equilibrium weakly dominates the nontreaty equilibrium. With asymmetric countries, the treaty need not offer improvements without tax harmonization. With harmonization, it is always possible to reach efficient capital allocations while increasing both countries' welfares only if neither uses deductions. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.