Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: The role of capital ownership
Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: The role of capital ownership
复制标题
进一步分析税收竞争中的领导地位：资本所有权的作用
DOI：
10.1007/s10797-012-9238-8
复制
发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Hikaru Ogawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kyoji Fukao;Kenta Ikeuchi;YoungGak Kim;Hyeog Ug Kwon;新井泰弘;Makiko KIMURA;Hikaru Ogawa
本文扩展了Kempf和Rota-Graziosi（J. Pub. 94：768-776，2010），认为在资本税竞争下，子博弈完美均衡（SPE）对应于两个Stackelberg结果。研究结果表明，Kempf和Rota-Graziosi的结果取决于资本所有权的形式。通过概括资本所有权的形式，本文表明，如果资本是由居民拥有的国家，而肯普夫和Rota-Graziosi的论点成立，如果资本是由非居民拥有的，则错误的移动结果作为SPE盛行。
This paper extends the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94:768–776, 2010), which argues that under capital tax competition the sub-game perfect equilibria (SPEs) correspond to two Stackelberg outcomes. The findings show that the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi result depends on the form of capital ownership. By generalizing the form of capital ownership, this paper shows that the simultaneous-move outcome prevails as an SPE if the capital is owned by residents in the countries, whereas the Kempf and Rota-Graziosi argument holds if the capital is owned by nonresidents.