Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful Lender
Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful Lender
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多来源贷款协调失败，抵御强大贷款人的成本
DOI：
10.1628/0932456022975394
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
Dorothea Schäfer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Hubert;Dorothea Schäfer
我们分析了在资本市场不完善的环境下，企业如何保护准客户，在这种环境下，转换出借人对借款人来说代价高昂，而且合同是不完整的。由于转换成本使公司容易受到事后剥削的影响，它可能希望使贷款多样化。然而，多来源贷款存在协调失败的问题。不协调的资金撤回将迫使财务困难的公司破产，即使如果贷方保持坚挺，它本可以得到救助。我们表明，如果单个贷款人有足够的议价能力，防止重新谈判的收益确实超过了协调失败的成本。
We analyze how a firm might protect quasirents in an environment of imperfect capital markets, where switching lenders is costly to the borrower, and contracts are incomplete. As switching costs make the firm vulnerable to ex post exploitation, it may want to diversify lending. Multiple-source lending, however, suffers from coordination failure. An uncoordinated withdrawal of funds will force a financially distressed firm into bankruptcy even though it could have been rescued if lenders had stayed firm. We show that the gains from preventing renegotiation do outweigh the cost of coordination failure if a single lender has sufficient bargaining power.