Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
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DOI：
10.1257/jel.48.4.935
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发表时间：
2010-12-01
影响因子：
12.6
通讯作者：
Jin, Ginger Zhe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dranove, David;Jin, Ginger Zhe
本文回顾了有关质量披露和认证的理论和实证文献。在将质量披露与其他质量保证机制进行比较并描述了质量披露的简要历史之后，我们解决了两组理论问题。首先，为什么卖家不自愿通过“拆解”过程披露信息？鉴于缺乏拆解，强制要求卖家披露信息是否可取？第二，当我们依赖认证人员充当质量披露的中介时，认证人员是否一定会报告公正和准确的信息？我们进一步回顾了关于这些问题的经验证据，特别关注医疗保健、教育和金融。实证综述包括质量衡量、第三方披露对消费者选择和卖家行为的影响，以及认证机构的经济学。(JEL D18，K32，L15，M31)
This essay reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on quality disclosure and certification. After comparing quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and describing a brief history of quality disclosure, we address two sets of theoretical issues. First, why don't sellers voluntarily disclose through a process of "unraveling" and, given the lack of unraveling, is it desirable to mandate seller disclosure? Second, when we rely on certifiers to act as the intermediary of quality disclosure, do certifiers necessarily report unbiased and accurate information? We further review empirical evidence on these issues, with a particular focus on healthcare, education, and finance. The empirical review covers quality measurement, the effect of third-party disclosure on consumer choice and seller behavior, as well as the economics of certifiers. (JEL D18, K32, L15, M31)