What Explains Agency Heads' Length of Tenure? Testing Managerial Background, Performance, and Political Environment Effects
What Explains Agency Heads' Length of Tenure? Testing Managerial Background, Performance, and Political Environment Effects
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什么解释了机构负责人的任期长度？
DOI：
10.1111/puar.12735
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
8.3
通讯作者：
Petrovsky N
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Petrovsky N
机构负责人的任期长短有许多影响因素。具体影响力的重要性，反过来又取决于机构负责人的预期目的地：在公共部门的其他地方，私营部门或退休。作者使用1989年至2012年英国中央政府执行机构的面板数据估计了机构负责人任期的生存模型。研究结果表明，表现不佳的机构的首席执行官被鼓励提前退休。没有证据表明，政治控制的变化会增加任何形式的离职风险，这表明要求这类官员离职的政治压力并不大。外部人员从中央政府外部招聘的机构负责人相对来说很难长期留住，因此，由老龄化劳动力退休造成的合适管理人员的潜在短缺可能很难通过从这一来源任命来弥补。
There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular influences, in turn, depends on the prospective destination of the agency head: elsewhere in the public sector, the private sector, or retirement. The authors estimate survival models of agency heads’ tenure using panel data on British central government executive agencies from 1989 to 2012. Findings suggest that chief executives of poorly performing agencies are encouraged to retire sooner. There is no evidence that a change in political control increases the risk of any form of exit, suggesting that political pressure to leave is not substantial for this type of official. Outsiders—agency heads recruited from outside central government—are relatively difficult to retain for a longer time, such that potential shortfalls in suitable managers caused by retirements in an aging workforce may be difficult to make up by appointing from this source.