Security of Offline Anonymous Electronic Cash Systems Against Insider Attacks By Untrusted Authorities Revisited
Security of Offline Anonymous Electronic Cash Systems Against Insider Attacks By Untrusted Authorities Revisited
复制标题
重新审视离线匿名电子现金系统免受不受信任当局内部攻击的安全性
DOI：
10.1109/incos.2011.146
复制
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kouichi Sakurai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takashi Nishide;Kouichi Sakurai
在电子现金系统的设计中，我们通常关注于防止客户的恶意行为。然而，由于诸如银行和证书颁发机构之类的权威机构可能拥有客户的重要秘密数据，因此还需要谨慎处理不可信权威机构的内部攻击。宫崎和Sakurai \cite{MS 99}首先评估了离线匿名电子现金系统的安全性，以对抗不可信当局的内部攻击。他们分析了现有电子现金系统的安全性，并将系统分为四种类型。在本文中，我们重新考虑离线匿名电子现金系统的安全性，包括最近的系统的基础上分类的宫崎和樱井。
In the design of electronic cash systems, we usually focus on preventing customers' malicious behaviors. However, since authorities such as banks and certificate authorities may have important secret data of customers, the insider attacks by the untrusted authorities also need to be handled carefully. Miyazaki and Sakurai \cite{MS99} first evaluated security of offline anonymous electronic cash systems against the insider attacks by untrusted authorities. They analyzed the security of the existing electronic cash systems and categorized the systems into four types. In this paper, we reconsider the security of offline anonymous electronic cash systems including more recent systems based on the classification of Miyazaki and Sakurai.