IC Piracy prevention via Design Withholding and Entanglement
IC Piracy prevention via Design Withholding and Entanglement
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通过设计扣留和纠缠预防 IC 盗版
DOI：
10.1109/aspdac.2015.7059112
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Wenjing Rao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Soroush Khaleghi;K. Zhao;Wenjing Rao
半导体行业的全球化已经引起了对可靠硬件的严重关注。特别地，不可信的制造商可以窃取设计的信息（逆向工程），和/或非法生产额外的芯片（IC盗版）。在解决这些攻击的许多候选者中，设计保留技术通过用芯片上的可重新配置块替换设计的一部分来工作，使得没有一个制造的芯片将正常工作，直到它们在可信设施中被激活，其中保留的功能被恢复到芯片上的可重新配置块中。然而，大多数现有的方法是基于ad-hoc的，并且面临两个主要挑战：1）对来自处于强势地位的攻击者（诸如制造商）的一类算法攻击的敏感性;以及2）通过必须在设计者方面支付的硬件成本的爆炸来校验（checkmated）扩展防御级别。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的保护方案，称为纠缠，它可以大大加强设计保留框架：1）通过迫使攻击者解决大量高计算复杂度的问题来防止算法攻击; 2）攻击成本（在计算复杂性方面）在设计者端是定量可控的，具有低硬件开销：虽然攻击的成本可能呈指数级增长，但强加给设计者的硬件开销仅呈线性增长。所提出的工作区别于以前的作品，不依赖于一些NP完全/NP难问题的解决方案的难度，而是，在攻击者必须解决的此类问题的指数增加的数量，同时小心地保持硬件开销的增长，通过纠缠可扩展。
Globalization of the semiconductor industry has raised serious concerns about trustworthy hardware. Particularly, an untrusted manufacturer can steal the information of a design (Reverse Engineering), and/or produce extra chips illegally (IC Piracy). Among many candidates that address these attacks, Design Withholding techniques work by replacing a part of the design with a reconfigurable block on chip, so that none of the manufactured chips will function properly until they are activated in a trusted facility, where the withheld function is restored back into the reconfigurable block on chip. However, most existing approaches are ad-hoc based, and are facing two major challenges: 1) susceptibility to a category of algorithmic attacks, from attackers in a strong position, such as a manufacturer; and 2) scaling up the defense level is checkmated by the explosion of hardware cost that has to be paid at the designer's side. In this paper, we propose a novel protection scheme, called Entanglement, which can substantially strengthen the Design Withholding framework: 1) the algorithmic attacks are prevented by forcing the attacker to solve a huge number of problems of high computational complexity; 2) the attack cost (in terms of computational complexity) is quantitatively controllable at the designer's end, with low hardware overhead: while the cost of attack can be increased exponentially, the hardware overhead imposed on the designer's side grows only linearly. The proposed work distinguishes itself from the previous works by not relying on the difficulty of finding the solution for some NP-Complete/NP-Hard problems, but rather, on the exponentially boosted number of such problems that an attacker has to solve, while carefully maintaining the growth of the hardware overhead to be scalable via Entanglement.