Interdependence, Government Constraints, and Economic Voting
Interdependence, Government Constraints, and Economic Voting
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相互依存、政府约束和经济投票
作者：
Timothy Hellwig
本文探讨了全球经济相互依存在制约公民对国内经济表现的反应方面的作用。虽然最近在经济投票方面的工作在解释支持的背景调解人方面取得了长足的进步，但分析并没有超越国内政治结构。与此同时，研究全球化的学者们强调了政府面临的来自世界经济的约束，但没有将他们的分析扩展到考察大众政治行为的作用。本文将这两个研究议程结合在一起。使用横截面的个人层面的数据，发现，会计暴露于世界经济抑制了国内经济基础的力量，民众的支持。其他分析表明，社会中不同群体对全球经济中介影响的敏感性并不一致，而是取决于职业差异。
This article examines the role of global economic interdependence in constraining citizens' responses to domestic economic performance. While recent work in economic voting has made strides in accounting for the contextual mediators of support, analyses have not gone beyond domestic political structures. At the same time, students of globalization highlight the constraints governments face from the world economy but do not extend their analyses to examine the role of mass political behavior. This article brings these two research agendas together. Using cross-sectional individual-level data, it is found that accounting for exposure to the world economy dampens the strength of domestic economic bases of popular support. Additional analyses show that the susceptibility of different groups in society to the global economy's mediating influences is not uniform but contingent on occupational differences.