Charge Based Power Side-Channel Attack Methodology for an Adiabatic Cipher
Charge Based Power Side-Channel Attack Methodology for an Adiabatic Cipher
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DOI：
10.3390/electronics10121438
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发表时间：
2021-06
期刊：
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Krithika Dhananjay;E. Salman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Krithika Dhananjay;E. Salman
SIMON是一种分组密码，旨在为物联网（IoT）等轻量级硬件应用提供灵活的安全选项。保护这种资源受限的硬件免受侧信道攻击构成了重大挑战。由于超低功耗，绝热电路操作最近已受到此类应用的关注。在这项工作中，开发了一种基于电荷的方法来安装基于相关功率分析（CPA）的侧信道攻击的绝热SIMON核心。基于电荷的方法通过将所需的功率样本数量减少两个数量级来显著降低攻击复杂度。CPA结果表明，与传统的基于静态CMOS的实现相比，检索绝热SIMON核的秘密密钥所需的测量公开（MTD）高4倍。还研究了目标信号负载电容增加对MTD的影响。可以观察到，如果目标信号驱动的负载对于绝热SIMON增加2倍，而对于基于静态CMOS的SIMON增加5倍，则MTD可以减少一半。绝热SIMON对目标信号电容的这种敏感性可以通过促进更有效的CPA攻击而引起严重的关注。
SIMON is a block cipher developed to provide flexible security options for lightweight hardware applications such as the Internet-of-things (IoT). Safeguarding such resource-constrained hardware from side-channel attacks poses a significant challenge. Adiabatic circuit operation has recently received attention for such applications due to ultra-low power consumption. In this work, a charge-based methodology is developed to mount a correlation power analysis (CPA) based side-channel attack to an adiabatic SIMON core. The charge-based method significantly reduces the attack complexity by reducing the required number of power samples by two orders of magnitude. The CPA results demonstrate that the required measurements-to-disclosure (MTD) to retrieve the secret key of an adiabatic SIMON core is 4× higher compared to a conventional static CMOS based implementation. The effect of increase in the target signal load capacitance on the MTD is also investigated. It is observed that the MTD can be reduced by half if the load driven by the target signal is increased by 2× for an adiabatic SIMON, and by 5× for a static CMOS based SIMON. This sensitivity to target signal capacitance of the adiabatic SIMON can pose a serious concern by facilitating a more efficient CPA attack.