A Trust-Aware Mechanism for Cloud Federation Formation
A Trust-Aware Mechanism for Cloud Federation Formation
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DOI：
10.1109/tcc.2019.2911831
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发表时间：
2021-10
影响因子：
6.5
通讯作者：
Lena Mashayekhy;Mark M. Nejad;Daniel Grosu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lena Mashayekhy;Mark M. Nejad;Daniel Grosu
云提供商可以通过将资源集中在一起来平衡负载、降低成本和管理需求峰值，从而形成云联盟。然而，形成云联盟是一个具有挑战性的问题，特别是考虑到云提供商自己决定参与云联盟的动机。在本文中，我们对云联盟的形成进行建模，以提供执行Map-heavy/Reduce-heavy程序所需的资源，同时考虑参与云提供商之间的信任和声誉。其目标是与信誉良好的云提供商组成云联盟，以实现其参与的最大利润。这是一个NP-hard双准则优化问题。我们引入了一种称为信任感知云联盟形成博弈的联盟图博弈来模拟云提供商之间的合作。我们为云联盟的形成设计了一种机制，使具有较高声誉的云提供商能够组织成联盟，从而降低其成本。我们提出的机制保证参与联合的云提供商获得最高利润，并确保形成的联合在执行应用程序时具有高可靠性。我们进行了大量的实验来表征所提出的机制的特性。结果表明，我们提出的机制产生了稳定的帕累托最优云联盟，不仅保证了参与的云提供商具有较高的声誉，而且保证了较高的个体利润。
Cloud providers can form cloud federations by pooling their resources together to balance their loads, reduce their costs, and manage demand spikes. However, forming cloud federations is a challenging problem, especially when considering the incentives of the cloud providers making their own decisions to participate in cloud federations. In this paper, we model the formation of cloud federations necessary to provide resources to execute Map-heavy/Reduce-heavy programs while considering the trust and reputation among the participating cloud providers. The objective is to form cloud federations with highly reputable cloud providers that achieve maximum profit for their participation. This is an NP-hard bicriteria optimization problem. We introduce a coalitional graph game, called trust-aware cloud federation formation game, to model the cooperation among cloud providers. We design a mechanism for cloud federation formation that enables the cloud providers with high reputation to organize into federations reducing their costs. Our proposed mechanism guarantees the highest profits for the participating cloud providers in the federations, and ensures high reliability of the formed federations in executing the applications. We perform extensive experiments to characterize the properties of the proposed mechanism. The results show that our proposed mechanism produces Pareto optimal and stable cloud federations that not only guarantee that the participating cloud providers have high reputation, but also high individual profits.