Clarity vs. Publicity in Disclosure of Public Information

Clarity vs. Publicity in Disclosure of Public Information
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公共信息披露中的清晰度与公开性

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2005984
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发表时间:
2012
期刊:
--
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Yun Zhang
Yun Zhang
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Qi Chen;T. Lewis;Yun Zhang

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社会规划者面临的挑战是向无法理解或判断信息准确性的私人代理人清楚、可信地披露公共信息。在本文中,我们分析了信息的最佳披露,其精度由社会规划者而非公众观察。我们表明,控制披露的程度(公开性)是向代理人表明公开披露重要性的重要工具。充分的公开披露只能在代理人理解的情况下提供更多信息,而对披露的充分理解(清晰)只能通过限制披露的公开来实现。这为限制披露的广泛做法提供了规范性解释,并揭示了公共披露的清晰度和公开性之间的基本权衡,规划者在与公众沟通时必须对此进行评估。
A social planner's challenge is to clearly and credibly disclose public information to private agents unable to understand or judge the information accuracy. In this paper, we analyze optimal disclosure of information whose precision is observed by the social planner, but not by the public. We show that controlling the extent (publicity) of disclosure is an important tool in signaling the importance of public disclosure to agents. Full publicity disclosure only provides more information if agents understand it, whereas full understanding (clarity) of the disclosure may only be achieved by restricting the publicity of disclosure. This provides a normative explanation for the widespread practice of restricting disclosure and reveals an essential trade-off between clarity and publicity in public disclosure that planners must evaluate when communicating to the public.
DOI: 10.2307/1912324
发表时间: 1986-09-01
期刊: ECONOMETRICA
影响因子: 6.1
作者:
CUKIERMAN, A;MELTZER, AH
通讯作者: MELTZER, AH
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1694
发表时间: 2011
期刊: B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics(Contributions)
影响因子: --
作者:
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