A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance
A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance
复制标题
监管合规的社会经济理论
DOI：
10.1108/03068299910229569
复制
发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
K. Kuperan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Sutinen;K. Kuperan
本文开发了一个丰富的监管合规理论模型。大量经验证据表明，监管合规的纯粹威慑模型主要关注制裁的确定性和严厉程度作为合规的关键决定因素，仅对合规行为提供了部分解释。为了提供更完整的解释，本文开发的模型将经济理论与心理学和社会学理论相结合，以解释影响个人是否遵守一组给定法规的决定的有形和无形动机。具体来说，除了与非法行为相关的传统成本和收入之外，该模型还考虑了道德义务和社会影响。虽然在自然资源管理背景下，这里发展的理论适用于各种制度条件。由此产生的框架能够设计和实施比以前更有效的合规和监管计划。
An enriched theoretical model of regulatory compliance is developed in this paper. The body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, provides only a partial explanation of compliance behavior. To offer a more complete explanation, the model developed herein integrates economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ decisions whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. While cast in a natural resource management context, the theory developed here is applicable to a variety of institutional conditions. The resulting framework enables the design and implementation of more efficient compliance and regulatory programs than was heretofore possible.