Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement
Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement
复制标题
兴奋剂、检查游戏和贝叶斯执法
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Roland Kirstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Roland Kirstein
“贝叶斯执法”假设兴奋剂测试是不完美的。此外，执行者有兴趣培养合规行为并做出正确的决策。存在三种类型的完美贝叶斯均衡，它们的惩罚方式有所不同：“暴虐”、“严厉”和“宽松”。在宽松均衡中，顺从行为的均衡概率最高；因此，执法的法律框架应旨在取消严厉和暴虐的平衡。只要信号不完善，就不可能实现全面威慑。增加惩罚不会增加合规行为的可能性。
“Bayesian enforcement” assumes that doping tests are imperfect. Moreover, the enforcer is interested in fostering compliant behavior and making correct decisions. Three types of perfect Bayesian equilibria exist, which differ in their punishment styles: “tyrannic,” “draconian,” and “lenient.” The equilibrium probability of compliant behavior is highest in the lenient equilibrium; therefore, the legal framework of the enforcement should aim at unselecting the draconian and tyrannic equilibria. Total deterrence is impossible as long as the signal is imperfect. An increase in punishment would not increase the probability of compliant behavior.