Epictetus
Epictetus
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爱比克泰德
DOI：
10.1017/s0009840x08001935
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
John Sellars
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文献类型：
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作者：
John Sellars
这本书，S。他在前言中告诉我们，这是他1990年博士论文的一个轻微修改版本，直到现在才在朋友的鼓励下向公众公布。这部作品的目的是阐明爱比克泰德的幸福自由观，因此，eudaimonia完全取决于一个人的prohaeresis。这本书在简短的导言之后分为四章。第一章介绍了爱比克泰德对“由我们决定”（ephhêmin）和意志作用（prohaeresis）的区分。讨论的主旨强调了不认为外部因素是好的实用主义原因，即它会使一个人的幸福感容易受到一个人控制之外的事件的影响。然而，我们很少听到这一点如何与斯多葛价值理论的细节相协调。在灵魂之美与身体之美的讨论中（pp. 23-4），令人惊讶的是，没有提到苏格拉底。讨论prohaeresis包含没有提到亚里士多德的早期使用的术语。事实上，在更广泛的哲学背景下，很少有背景或上下文信息来解释爱比克泰德。然而，对于爱比克泰德为了幸福而牺牲真理，准备相信他的精神健康所需要的任何东西（第37页）的异议，有一个富有洞察力的讨论。作为S.注意到，如果爱比克泰德实用主义地认为外部因素与他的幸福无关，然后它起作用了，他变得幸福了，那么它们显然与幸福无关。然而，他把斯多葛主义作为一种激情（第40页，跟随R. R.谢尔曼）不仅值得怀疑，而且还被之前的大部分叙述所削弱。第二章讨论了爱比克泰德伦理学中外部因素的作用，它们有价值（axia），但不是好的（agatha）。S.看到了一种张力之间的意愿上帝的意愿和自主权的个人的prohaeresis，但这里的关键点是，每一个将与其他和谐，因为两者都将是理性的。在这种情况下，prohaeresis不是自由意志被视为随机自发性，因为一些现代哲学家会持有，而是理性的选择，因此，与理性的宇宙和谐。第三章探讨社会关系，特别是斯多葛学派的圣人如何爱。S.他想从斯多葛学派的批评中拯救爱的概念（见例如Diss. 4.1.15-18，引用于第100页）。106-7），但在他提出的证据的基础上，仍然不清楚是否有，正如他所希望的，一个更积极的概念，爱在工作中超越了诅咒的观点，它只不过是非理性的奴役。对文本证据进行更全面的讨论会很有帮助。在philein和eramai之间可能有一个技术上的区别，但如果是这样的话，它没有被讨论，语言上的区别被翻译为“爱”所掩盖。在她最近的研究中，
This volume, S. tells us in the Foreword, is a lightly revised version of his 1990 doctoral dissertation, only now o¶ered to the public in the wake of encouragement from a friend. The aim of the work is to explicate Epictetus’ conception of happiness as freedom, so that eudaimonia is dependent solely on one’s prohairesis. After a brief introduction the book divides into four chapters. The μrst chapter introduces Epictetus’ distinction between what is and is not ‘up to us’ (eph’ hêmin) and the role of volition (prohairesis). The tenor of the discussion emphasises the pragmatic reasons for not holding externals to be good, namely that it will make one’s eudaimonia vulnerable to events out of one’s control. Yet we hear very little about how this might be reconciled with the details of Stoic value theory. In the discussion of the beauty of the soul versus the beauty of the body (pp. 23–4) there are, surprisingly, no references to Socrates. The discussion of prohairesis contains no mention of Aristotle’s earlier use of the term either. Indeed, there is very little by way of background or contextual information to situate Epictetus within a wider philosophical context. There is, though, an insightful discussion of the objection that Epictetus sacriμces truth for the sake of happiness, being prepared to believe whatever his mental well-being requires (p. 37). As S. notes, if Epictetus pragmatically holds that externals are irrelevant for his happiness, and then it works and he becomes happy, then they clearly are irrelevant to happiness. However, his presentation of Stoicism as a passion (p. 40, following R.R. Sherman) is not only questionable but also undermined by much of the account that precedes it. The second chapter deals with the role of externals in Epictetus’ ethics, which have value (axia) but are not good (agatha). S. sees a tension between willing what God wills and the autonomy of the individual’s prohairesis, but the key point here is that each will be in harmony with the other because both will be rational. In this context prohairesis is not free will conceived as random spontaneity, as some modern philosophers would hold, but rather rational choice and, as such, in harmony with the rational cosmos. The third chapter examines social relationships and in particular how the Stoic sage loves. S. wants to rescue the notion of love from Stoic criticisms (see e.g. Diss. 4.1.15–18, quoted at pp. 106–7) but on the basis of the evidence he presents it remains unclear whether there is, as he hopes, a more positive notion of love at work in Epictetus beyond the damning view of it as little more than irrational slavery. A fuller discussion of the textual evidence would have been helpful. There may be a technical distinction at work here between philein and eramai but if so it is not discussed, and the linguistic distinction is obscured by translating both as ‘love’. In her recent study