IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLURALITY CORRESPONDENCE IN UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES BY A BOUNDED MECHANISM
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLURALITY CORRESPONDENCE IN UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES BY A BOUNDED MECHANISM
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无支配策略中的多重对应的有界机制的实现
DOI：
10.11398/economics1986.45.97
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Shinji Ohseto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shinji Ohseto
1.引言本文研究了假设每个智能体都使用非支配策略的实现问题。使用非支配策略作为解决方案概念的吸引力之一是信息假设的弱点。假设代理知道自己的偏好和机制的结构。与纳什均衡概念相反，不假设代理人知道其他代理人的偏好。
1. Introduction This paper studies the implementation problem under the assumption that each agent uses undominated strategies. One of the appeals of using undominated strategies as a solution concept is the weakness of the assumption on information. Agents are assumed to know their own preferences and the structure of a mechanism. It is not assumed, in contrast to Nash-type equilibrium concepts, that agents know other agents' preferences.