Types for Location and Data Security in Cloud Environments
Types for Location and Data Security in Cloud Environments
复制标题
云环境中的位置和数据安全类型
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Dominic Duggan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ivan Gazeau;Tom Chothia;Dominic Duggan
云服务提供商通常被信任是真实的，被发现攻击自己的客户所造成的损害超过了此类攻击可能获得的任何好处。另一方面，预计部分云服务用户可能存在主动恶意行为。在这样的开放系统中，每个位置可以运行独立于其他位置(并且可能是秘密的)开发的代码。在本文中，我们提出了一种类型化语言，它确保对特定设备上的数据施加的访问限制将被运行类型化代码的所有其他设备遵守。除非策略直接将信任放在未键入的位置，否则未键入的受攻击设备仍可以与键入的设备交互，而不会违反策略。重要的是，我们的类型系统不需要中间件层或所有用户向现有的PKI注册，它允许设备动态创建新的身份。语言保证的机密性属性是为任何类型的入侵者定义的：我们认为被标记的生物相似性，即攻击者不能区分由于保护值的变化而不同的两个场景。这表明我们的主要结果是，对于一个运行类型良好的代码并且只信任其他类型良好的设备的设备，编程错误不会导致数据泄漏。
Cloud service providers are often trusted to be genuine, the damage caused by being discovered to be attacking their own customers outweighs any benefits such attacks could reap. On the other hand, it is expected that some cloud service users may be actively malicious. In such an open system, each location may run code which has been developed independently of other locations (and which may be secret). In this paper, we present a typed language which ensures that the access restrictions put on data on a particular device will be observed by all other devices running typed code. Untyped, compromised devices can still interact with typed devices without being able to violate the policies, except in the case when a policy directly places trust in untyped locations. Importantly, our type system does not need a middleware layer or all users to register with a preexisting PKI, and it allows for devices to dynamically create new identities. The confidentiality property guaranteed by the language is defined for any kind of intruder: we consider labeled bisimilarity i.e. an attacker cannot distinguish two scenarios that differ by the change of a protected value. This shows our main result that, for a device that runs well typed code and only places trust in other well typed devices, programming errors cannot cause a data leakage.