Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
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公平性和策略的考虑：序列博弈的实验数据
DOI：
10.2307/2118366
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发表时间：
1992
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
A. Roth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Vesna Prasnikar;A. Roth
来自讨价还价实验的实验室数据引发了一场争论，涉及博弈论各个部分作为可观察行为的描述性理论的前景，以及成功的描述性理论是否、在多大程度上以及如何必须考虑人们对“公平”的看法。不同的研究者对所观察到的讨价还价现象提出了合理的解释，这导致了对三种不同游戏中应该观察到的情况的明显不同的预测。因此，可以对此类游戏进行尖锐的实验测试，本文报告了此类测试的结果。
Laboratory data from bargaining experiments have started a debate about the prospects for various parts of game theory as descriptive theories of observable behavior, and about whether, to what extent, and how a successful descriptive theory must take into account peoples' perceptions of "fairness." Plausible explanations of the observed bargaining phenomena advanced by different investigators lead to markedly different predictions about what should be observed in three different games. A sharp experimental test is thus possible on this class of games, and the present paper reports the results of such a test.