Why emergentist accounts of cognition are more theoretically constraining than structured probability accounts: comment on Griffiths et al. and McClelland et al.
Why emergentist accounts of cognition are more theoretically constraining than structured probability accounts: comment on Griffiths et al. and McClelland et al.
复制标题
为什么认知的涌现论解释比结构化概率解释在理论上更具约束力:对 Griffiths 等人的评论。
DOI:
10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.013
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发表时间:
2010
影响因子:
19.9
通讯作者:
Altmann GT
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Altmann GT
Structured probability approaches to cognition aim to reverse-engineer the human mind by identifying ideal solutions to the inductive problems that it faces [1]. Dynamical systems approaches [2] explain cognitive behaviour as the emergent consequence of statistical regularities in the learning environment. Both approaches offer insights into how statistical regularity in the environment can map onto human cognition. However, taken on its own, the ideal solution approach is akin to modelling evolution as a process that has a goal ‘in mind’, whereby a solution through which to arrive at that goal must be found regardless of the environmental constraints on whether the goal is achievable through the gradual (natural) selection processes that underpin evolution. The dynamical systems approach takes account of both ‘exogenous’ environmental constraints and (dynamically changing)‘endogenous’ constraints on an organism’s maturational state to explain how the final state is constrained by these different ‘pressures’[3]. In doing so, it also explains two related phenomena that have hitherto been largely overlooked by structured probability approaches: the consequences of sampling the environment across time [4] and the relationship between object representation and probability induction.One emergentist system that has been well studied is the simple recurrent network [5]; it samples the input with a fixed temporal resolution but is in principle able to allow the emergence of representations that span multiple temporal resolutions (ie that capture different kinds of contingency, each across different time frames, between the successive inputs to which the network is exposed)[4]. In effect, hierarchical representation emerges (reflecting systematic variation occurring across different time frames). The adult ability to encode hierarchical representations and multiple contingences across multiple time frames could therefore emerge through the operation of a sampling mechanism that might initially be bound to just a