Asymmetries in international environmental agreements
Asymmetries in international environmental agreements
复制标题
国际环境协定中的不对称性
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
A. de Zeeuw
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Y. Pavlova;A. de Zeeuw
摘要本文考虑了当各国在排放相关利益和环境损害方面不对称时，自我执行的国际环境协定。同时考虑到这些不对称性，就产生了大规模的稳定联盟，也没有签署国之间转让的选择。然而，只有当这些国家具有相对较高的边际效益和相对较低的边际环境损害时，这些大型稳定联盟才有可能。这类国家对共同利益几乎没有贡献，将这类国家纳入稳定联盟的合作收益也很小。这证实了一个持久的结果，在这个文献中，大的稳定联盟通常携手合作的低收益。在没有转移支付选择的情况下，与重要的国家建立一个小型稳定联盟总是比与不重要的国家建立一个大型稳定联盟更好。只有通过转移支付，一个庞大而稳定的联盟才能表现得更好。
Abstract This paper considers self-enforcing international environmental agreements when countries are asymmetric with respect to emission-related benefits and environmental damage. Considering these asymmetries simultaneously yields large stable coalitions, also without the option of transfers between signatories. However, these large stable coalitions are only possible if they include countries that have relatively high marginal benefits and a relatively low marginal environmental damage. This type of countries hardly contributes to the common good and the gains of cooperation from including this type of countries in the stable coalition are small. This confirms a persistent result in this literature that large stable coalitions usually go hand in hand with low gains of cooperation. Without the option of transfers it is always better to have a small stable coalition with countries that matter than a large stable coalition with countries that do not matter. Only with transfers might a large stable coalition be able to perform better.
DOI：
10.2307/134972
发表时间：
1983-01-01
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
DASPREMONT, C;JACQUEMIN, A;WEYMARK, JA
通讯作者：
WEYMARK, JA