The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
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罚款和监禁的最佳利用
DOI：
10.3386/w0932
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发表时间：
1982
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Shavell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Polinsky;S. Shavell
本文探讨了使用罚款和监禁来阻止个人从事有害活动的问题。这些制裁分别以及一起分析，首先是相同的风险中性的个人，然后是两组风险中性的个人，他们的财富不同。当单独使用罚款时，个人是相同的，最佳罚款和逮捕概率是这样的，存在一些“威慑不足”。“如果个人财富不同，那么高财富群体的最佳罚款超过低财富群体的罚款。当单独使用监禁且个体相同时，最优监禁期限和概率可能是存在不足威慑或过度威慑的。如果个人财富不同，高财富群体的最佳监禁期限可能长于或短于低财富群体的期限。当罚款和监禁同时使用时，最好在可能以监禁作为补充之前，尽可能使用罚款。还讨论了风险厌恶对这些结果的影响。
This paper examines the use of fines and imprisonment to deter individuals from engaging in harmful activities. These sanctions are analyzed separately as well as together, first for identical risk-neutral individuals and then for two groups of risk-neutral individuals who differ by wealth. When fines are used alone and individuals are identical, the optimal fine and probability of apprehension are such that there is some "underdeterrence." If individuals differ by wealth, then the optimal fine for the high wealth group exceeds the fine for the low wealth group. When imprisonment is used alone and individuals are identical, the optimal imprisonment term and probability may be such that there is either underdeterrence or overdeterrence. If individuals differ by wealth, the optimal imprisonment term for the high wealth group may be longer or shorter than the term for the low wealth group. When fines and imprisonment are used together, it is desirable to use the fine to its maximum feasible extent before possibly supplementing it with an imprisonment term. The effects of risk aversion on these results are also discussed.