Endogenous State Weakness: Paramilitaries and Electoral Politics in Rio de Janeiro
Endogenous State Weakness: Paramilitaries and Electoral Politics in Rio de Janeiro
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内生的国家弱点:里约热内卢的准军事组织和选举政治
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发表时间:
2014
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通讯作者:
Benjamin Lessing
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作者:
F. D. Hidalgo;Benjamin Lessing
State weakness can be self-reinforcing, encouraging rebel or criminal groups to directly challenge state power, generating frontal conflicts that can further weaken the state. With paramilitaries—non-revolutionary, pro-government groups, often with informal ties to state forces—state-weakening occurs less through outright conflict than more oblique channels, including electoral politics. We show this through an analysis of Rio de Janeiro’s police-linked milı́cia groups. Once unique to a handful of favelas (slums), where they kept out the city’s powerful drug syndicates, milı́cias rapidly proliferated between 2003 and 2007 to control some 170 communities. The election of milı́cia leaders and sympathetic police-related candidates in 2006 led to speculation that armed coercion by milı́cias had effectively transformed dominated communities into electoral bailiwicks. We test this hypothesis through a difference-in-difference analysis of election results from 1998, 2002, and 2006, exploiting the timing of milı́cia expansion to estimate the impact of domination on voting behavior. Controlling for potential confounders with a neighborhood-level panel data set, we find that milı́cia rule causes the vote shares of police-affiliated candidates to increase dramatically. We then provide evidence of how milı́cias used political power to weaken state efforts to curtail their activities. ∗Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. †Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.