Measuring “Schmeduling”
Measuring “Schmeduling”
复制标题
衡量“计划”
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdz045
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Dmitry Taubinsky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Rees;Dmitry Taubinsky
个人使用什么心理模型来近似他们的税收计划？使用美国联邦所得税税率表的激励预测，我们估计的流行“schmeduling”构造心理表征的非线性激励计划的策略。我们发现的证据广泛依赖的“熨烫”启发式，线性化的税收计划使用一个人的平均税率。在我们的首选规范中，43%的人口使用熨斗。我们没有发现依赖于“聚光灯”启发式，线性化的税收计划使用一个人的边际税率的证据。我们发现，熨烫的存在合理化的经验模式，在个人的税收责任的看法在整个收入分配。此外，虽然我们的经验框架容纳了丰富的其他误解，我们发现，一个简单的模型，包括只有ironers和正确的预测准确地预测平均低估的边际税率。我们复制了我们的发现，普遍熨烫，缺乏其他系统性的误解，在一个对照实验中，研究实际利害关系的决定，在外源不同的税收时间表。为了说明熨烫启发式的政策相关性，我们表明，它增加了累进税的收益在一个标准模型的收入选择。我们在美国税收制度的校准模型中量化了这些好处。
What mental models do individuals use to approximate their tax schedule? Using incentivized forecasts of the U.S. Federal income tax schedule, we estimate the prevalence of the “schmeduling” heuristics for constructing mental representations of nonlinear incentive schemes. We find evidence of widespread reliance on the “ironing” heuristic, which linearizes the tax schedule using one’s average tax rate. In our preferred specification, 43% of the population irons. We find no evidence of reliance on the “spotlighting” heuristic, which linearizes the tax schedule using one’s marginal tax rate. We show that the presence of ironing rationalizes a number of empirical patterns in individuals’ perceptions of tax liability across the income distribution. Furthermore, while our empirical framework accommodates a rich class of other misperceptions, we find that a simple model including only ironers and correct forecasters accurately predicts average underestimation of marginal tax rates. We replicate our finding of prevalent ironing, and a lack of other systematic misperceptions, in a controlled experiment that studies real-stakes decisions across exogenously varied tax schedules. To illustrate the policy relevance of the ironing heuristic, we show that it augments the benefits of progressive taxation in a standard model of earnings choice. We quantify these benefits in a calibrated model of the U.S. tax system.