The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec
The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec
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分裂国家的政治经济学：魁北克的案例
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Young
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Young
在没有压迫的情况下，考虑脱离的亚单位公民会仔细权衡不同结果的收益和成本。在这里，这些成本是高度可变的：它们取决于每个州的战略行为，以及分裂后是否会重新建立合作关系。以魁北克为例，可以看出，前任国家不合作的威胁可能被认为是不可信的。然而，基本博弈论表明，在重复游戏的情况下，报复性不合作可能是一种理性的策略。此外，它还表明，达成妥协解决方案需要潜在的分裂国发出可信的威胁，接受一个没有经济合作的主权。在现代福利国家，这些风险严重到足以让脱离联邦的情况变得罕见，而渐进式的宪法改革则成为常态。
In the absence of oppression, citizens of a sub-unit who contemplate secession carefully weigh the benefits and costs of different outcomes. Here these costs are shown to be highly variable: they depend on the strategic behavior of each state and on whether cooperative relations would be re-established after secession. Using Quebec as a case, it is shown that threats of non-cooperation by the predecessor state may be discounted as not credible. Elementary game theory, however, shows that, with repeat play, retaliatory non-cooperation could be a rational strategy. Moreover, it is shown that reaching a compromise solution requires a credible threat on the part of the potential secessor to accept a sovereignty where there would be no economic cooperation. In modern welfare states, these risks are severe enough to make secession rare, and incremental constitutional change the norm.