ReversiSpec: Reversible Coherence Protocol for Defending Transient Attacks
ReversiSpec: Reversible Coherence Protocol for Defending Transient Attacks
复制标题
ReversiSpec:用于防御瞬态攻击的可逆一致性协议
DOI:
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复制
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Xuehai Qian
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
You Wu;Xuehai Qian
The recent works such as InvisiSpec, SafeSpec, and Cleanup-Spec, among others, provided promising solutions to defend speculation induced (transient) attacks. However, they intro-duce delay either when a speculative load becomes safe in the redo approach or when it is squashed in the undo approach. We argue that it is due to the lack of fundamental mechanisms for reversing the effects of speculation in a cache coherence protocol. Based on mostly unmodified coherence protocol, the redo approach avoids leaving trace at the expense of double loads; the undo approach "stops the world" in recovery to avoid interference. This paper provides the first solution to the fundamental problem. Specifically, we propose ReversiSpec, a comprehensive solution to mitigate speculative induced attacks.ReversiSpec is a reversible approach that uses speculative buffers in all cache levels to record the effects of speculative execution. When a speculative load becomes safe, a merge operation adds the effects of speculative execution to the global state. When a speculative load is squashed, a purge operation clears the buffered speculative execution states from speculative buffer. The key problem solved by the paper is the first demonstration of a reversible cache coherence protocol that naturally rollbacks the effects of squashed speculative execution. We design two concrete coherence protocols, ReversiCC-Lazy and ReversiCC-Eager providing the same functionality with different trade-offs. Our solution closes a crucial gap in modern architecture: just like the mechanisms to roll back the speculation effects inside a processor, ReversiSpec provides the mechanisms to roll back the state of the whole coherence protocol.
DOI:
10.1145/3411504.3421216
发表时间:
2020-03
期刊:
Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security
影响因子:
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作者:
Jacob Fustos;M. Bechtel;H. Yun
通讯作者:
Jacob Fustos;M. Bechtel;H. Yun
DOI:
10.1109/isca45697.2020.00022
发表时间:
2019-11
期刊:
2020 ACM/IEEE 47th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA)
影响因子:
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作者:
S. Ainsworth;Timothy M. Jones
通讯作者:
S. Ainsworth;Timothy M. Jones