The Impact of Accounting Conservatism on the Compensation Relevance of UK Earnings

The Impact of Accounting Conservatism on the Compensation Relevance of UK Earnings
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会计保守主义对英国收益薪酬相关性的影响

DOI:
10.1080/09638180601102222
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发表时间:
2006
影响因子:
3.3
通讯作者:
Vincent O'Connell
Vincent O'Connell
中科院分区:
管理学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Vincent O'Connell

文献摘要

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摘要长期以来,由于会计稳健性,收益与收益之间的同期相关性在好(坏)消息的公司年度较低(较高)。与此同时,以前的分析机构的工作表明,会计盈余的补偿作用可能更大(如噪音过滤和激励平衡的任务)时,收益和回报之间的同期相关性较低。因此,由于会计稳健性意味着收益有一个较低的相关性,在好消息公司年的回报,本论文假设,英国CEO现金薪酬表现出较强(弱)的敏感性,会计盈余在好(坏)消息公司年。实证研究结果为这一假设提供了实质性的支持,并对替代估计方法具有鲁棒性。此外,研究结果似乎不能归因于既定的影响,盈利持续性的补偿收益协会。总体而言,调查结果是一致的概念,英国薪酬委员会似乎采取认知会计稳健性的影响时,授予基于盈利的补偿。此外,目前的工作提供了额外的见解之间的相互作用的性质的合同和会计数字的估值作用。
Abstract It has long been established that because of accounting conservatism, the contemporaneous correlation between returns and earnings is lower (higher) for good (bad) news firm-years. Meanwhile, prior analytical agency work suggests that the compensation role of accounting earnings is potentially greater (for tasks such as noise filtering and incentive balancing) when the contemporaneous correlation between earnings and returns is lower. Hence, since accounting conservatism implies that earnings have a lower correlation with returns in good news firm-years, the present paper hypothesises that UK CEO cash compensation exhibits a stronger (weaker) sensitivity to accounting earnings in good (bad) news firm-years. The empirical findings offer substantial support for this hypothesis and are robust to alternative estimation methodologies. In addition, the results appear not to be attributable to the well-established impact of earnings persistence on the compensation–earnings association. Overall, the findings are consistent with the notion that UK compensation committees appear to take cognisance of the impact of accounting conservatism when awarding earnings-based compensation. In addition, the present work offers additional insights into the nature of the interaction between the contracting and valuation roles of accounting numbers.