Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations
Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations
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主动和被动预期下具有网络外部性的双寡头垄断中的价格与数量
DOI：
10.1002/mde.3217
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jin-Li Hu;Satoshi Honma;and Hsiao-Ping Hsieh;本間聡;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Kiyoshi Matsubara;Yasuhiko Nakamura
本研究探讨双头垄断厂商的策略契约内生选择，双头垄断厂商的产品具有网络外部性，且具有某种相容性。我们采用两种类型的期望-主动和被动-作为消费者的期望，每个企业的均衡市场份额。此外，我们还考虑了作为企业内部结构的所有权和经营权分离的管理案例和企业家案例。我们推导了古诺竞争和贝特朗竞争的性质，即在网络不完全相容的情况下，在被动预期和主动预期下的均衡市场结构。
This study examines the endogenous choice of strategic contracts in a duopoly composed of firms that produce goods with network externalities with some sort of compatibility. We adopt two types of expectations—active and passive—as consumers' expectations for each firm's equilibrium market share. In addition, we take into account the managerial case and entrepreneurial case with and without separation between ownership and management, as firms' internal structures. We derive the properties in the Cournot competition and the Bertrand competition as the equilibrium market structures under both passive and active expectations under imperfectly compatibility of networks.