Bribery and voter control under voting-rule uncertainty
Bribery and voter control under voting-rule uncertainty
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投票规则不确定性下的贿赂和选民控制
DOI：
10.5555/2615731.2615744
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
L. Hemaspaandra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Erdélyi;E. Hemaspaandra;L. Hemaspaandra
我们研究了“投票规则不确定性”下的操纵行为，特别是贿赂和控制，这意味着有两个或更多的规则可以用来决定选举的结果。我们的亮点之一是我们展示了一个“关系很重要”的新案例，我们将操纵和贿赂联系在一起，表明许多单一贿赂的情况是多项式时间的，我们探索了贿赂与底层系统的控制复杂性及其“不确定”组合之间的关系，我们获得了许多关于投票规则不确定性下自然投票规则复杂性的结果，最值得注意的是通过在形式为k1-Approval， kl- approval,k1-Veto，kl-Veto的选举族中添加选民的控制。
We study manipulative actions, especially bribery and control, under "voting-rule uncertainty," which means that there are two or more rules that may be used to determine the election's outcome. Among our highlights are that we show a new case in which "ties matter," we link manipulation and bribery in a way that shows many cases of single-bribery to be in polynomial time, we explore the relations between the bribery and control complexities of the underlying systems and their "uncertain" combination, and we obtain many results about the complexity of natural voting rules under voting-rule uncertainty, most notably regarding control by adding voters under election families of the form k1-Approval, kll-Approval,k1-Veto,kl-Veto.