Local politics and economic geography

Local politics and economic geography
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当地政治和经济地理

DOI:
10.1111/jors.12118
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发表时间:
2014
影响因子:
3
通讯作者:
Berliant M. and T. Tabuchi
Berliant M. and T. Tabuchi
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Takanori Ago;Tadashi Morita;Takatoshi Tabuchi and Kazuhiro Yamamoto;Pascal Mossay and Takatoshi Tabuchi;Berliant M. and T. Tabuchi

文献摘要

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当选民是移动的并且可能将他们自己分类到地方选区时,我们考虑在国家和地方选举中的信息聚合。使用一个标准模型的私人信息的选民在选举中结合一个新的经济地理模型,聚集发生的经济原因,而选民分层发生由于政治偏好。当贸易成本更高时,人们往往出于经济原因聚集在一起,导致政治部门的信息完全相等。在自由贸易下,人们将自己划分为地区,其中大多数地区是两极分化的,导致这些地区没有完全的信息等价。
We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a new economic geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons, whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts.