Hindsight bias in judgements of the predictability of flash floods: An experimental study for testimony at a court trial and legal decision making.

Hindsight bias in judgements of the predictability of flash floods: An experimental study for testimony at a court trial and legal decision making.
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山洪可预测性判断中的事后偏见:法庭审判证词和法律决策的实验研究。

DOI:
10.1002/acp.3797
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
2.4
通讯作者:
T.
T.
中科院分区:
心理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yama;H.;Akita;M.;& Kawasaki;T.

文献摘要

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作为第一作者在法庭审判中的专家证词的一部分,我们调查了对真实的山洪暴发的可预测性的看法的后见之明偏见。在实验1中,研究人员向参与者展示了山洪暴发前拍摄的照片,并要求他们对水的浑浊程度进行评级,并判断洪水发生的可能性。被告知发生了山洪暴发的参与者认为河流更加泥泞,并判断洪水比对照组参与者更有可能发生。他们的判断是事后诸葛亮。实验2的结果显示,当指示从浑浊到洪水的因果关系时,被试判断河流更浑浊。这些结果被解释为自上而下的感知被结果信息和因果关系信息隐含地调整。考虑到后见之明的偏见,法官决定被告没有责任预测山洪暴发。
As part of the first author's expert testimony at a court trial, we investigated hindsight bias in perceptions of the predictability of a real flash flood. Participants were presented with pictures taken before the flash flood and asked to rate the muddiness of the water and judge the likelihood of flooding in Experiment 1. Participants who were informed that a flash flood had occurred perceived the river as muddier and judged a flood to be more likely than control participants. Their judgment was biased by hindsight. The results of Experiment 2 revealed that when the causality from muddiness to flooding was instructed, participants judged the river as muddier. These results were interpreted as top‐down perception being implicitly adjusted by outcome information and causality information. The judges decided that the defendants had no responsibility to predict the flash flood, taking the hindsight bias into consideration.