Impact of Leverage on Investment by Major Shareholders: Evidence from Listed Firms in China
Impact of Leverage on Investment by Major Shareholders: Evidence from Listed Firms in China
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DOI：
10.1080/17538963.2014.947707
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发表时间：
2014-09
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Yuan Yuan-Yuan;K. Motohashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yuan Yuan-Yuan;K. Motohashi
在本文中，我们分析了1999年至2009年期间杠杆是否对投资产生了影响，以及这些影响（如果存在）在具有不同投资机会和不同主要股东的公司之间是否存在差异。为了区分不同主要股东的治理情况，我们将中国上市公司分为中央政府所有企业（CSOE）、地方政府所有企业（LSOE）和非国有企业（NONSOE）。我们的结果如下。首先，我们的分析表明，杠杆确实对 CSOE、LSOE 和 NONSOE 投资产生显着的负面影响。其次，在LSOE和非国有企业中，杠杆对低增长企业的负面影响比一般企业更强，这意味着杠杆对投资的约束效应可以在LSOE和非国有企业中发现。然而最后，在中央企业中却没有观察到这种效应。我们的第一个发现是，杠杆的影响因公司主要股东的不同而异。
In this paper, we analyze whether leverage had impacts on investment in the period 1999–2009, and whether these impacts, if they exist, differed among companies with different investment opportunities and with different major shareholders. In order to identify governance with different major shareholders, we grouped China’s listed firms into central government owned firms (CSOEs), local government owned firms (LSOEs) and non-state-owned firms (NONSOEs). Our results are as follows. First, our analysis reveals that leverage does have significantly negative impacts on CSOE, LSOE and NONSOE investments. Secondly, in LSOEs and NONSOEs, negative leverage impacts on low-growth firms are stronger than average firms, implying that a disciplinary effect of leverage over investment can be found in LSOEs and NONSOEs. Finally, however, no such effect can be observed in CSOEs. We have provided a first finding that the effect of leverage varies according to a firm’s major shareholders.