A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
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DOI：
10.1038/nature04605
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发表时间：
2006-05-25
期刊：
影响因子：
64.8
通讯作者：
Nowak, Martin A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ohtsuki, Hisashi;Hauert, Christoph;Nowak, Martin A.
所有生物系统的一个基本方面是合作。从单细胞到动物群体，生物组织的许多层面都需要合作性相互作用（1 - 4）。人类社会在很大程度上建立在促进合作的机制之上（5 - 7）。众所周知，在无结构的种群中，自然选择青睐背叛者而非合作者。然而，目前人们对研究结构化种群和图上的进化博弈有很大兴趣（8 - 17）。这些研究认识到这样一个事实：谁与谁相遇不是随机的，而是由空间关系或社会网络决定的（18 - 24）。在此我们描述一个令人惊讶的简单规则，它对我们所分析的所有图，包括环、空间晶格、随机正则图、随机图和无标度网络（25，26）都是一个很好的近似：如果利他行为的收益b除以成本c超过平均邻居数量k，即b/c > k，那么自然选择就有利于合作。在这种情况下，即使没有声誉效应或策略复杂性，合作也可因“社会粘性”而进化。
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals(1-4). Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation(5-7). It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs(8-17). These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks(18-24). Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks(25,26): natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.