Catalytic Cooperation
Catalytic Cooperation
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DOI：
10.1162/glep_a_00561
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发表时间：
2020-11-01
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Hale, Thomas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hale, Thomas
学者们通常将全球公共物品或公共资源的政治模型视为困难的集体行动问题。国际组织理论旨在解释机构如何通过解决搭便车问题来促进合作。基于对典型的全球集体行动问题——国际气候减缓——的分析，本文对问题的诊断和相应的制度补救措施提出了挑战。减缓气候变化的重要要素表现出三个与典型模型不同的关键特征：联合商品、偏好异质性和收益递增。这些特征的存在为“催化合作”创造了可能性。在这种情况下，合作的主要障碍不是搭便车的威胁，而是缺乏首先采取行动的动力。国家和其他参与者试图通过创建“催化机构”来解决这个问题，这些机构致力于随着时间的推移将参与者的偏好和战略转向合作结果。虽然催化机构在世界政治的许多领域中随处可见，但 2015 年《巴黎气候变化协议》将这种合作逻辑置于其核心，这增加了类似催化机构可能促进以类似问题结构为特征的世界政治其他领域合作的可能性。
Scholars typically model the politics of global public goods or common pool resources as difficult collective action problems. Theories of international organization aim to explain how institutions can promote cooperation by solving the free rider problem. Based on an analysis of a quintessential global collective action problem-international climate mitigation-this article challenges both this diagnosis of the problem and the concomitant institutional remedies. Important elements of climate mitigation exhibit three key features that depart from the canonical model: joint goods, preference heterogeneity, and increasing returns. The presence of these features creates the possibility for "catalytic cooperation." Under such conditions, the chief barrier to cooperation is not the threat of free riding but the lack of incentive to act in the first place. States and other actors seek to solve this problem by creating "catalytic institutions" that work to shift actors' preferences and strategies toward cooperative outcomes over time. While catalytic institutions can be seen in many areas of world politics, the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change has put this logic of cooperation at its core, raising the possibility that similar catalytic institutions may facilitate cooperation in other areas of world politics characterized by analogous problem structures.