Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly
Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly
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DOI：
10.1007/s00712-015-0452-6
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发表时间：
2016-03-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Matsumura, Toshihiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Haraguchi, Junichi;Matsumura, Toshihiro
我们重新讨论了比较价格和数量竞争的经典讨论，但在混合寡头垄断中，一家国有上市公司与私营公司竞争。已经表明，在混合双寡头垄断中，价格竞争为私营企业带来更大的利润。这意味着企业在价格竞争下面临较弱的竞争，这与私人寡头垄断的情况形成鲜明对比。在这里，我们采用了一个标准的差异化寡头与线性需求。我们发现，无论企业的数量，价格竞争产生更高的福利。然而，利润排名取决于私营企业的数量。我们发现，如果私人企业的数量大于或等于5，这是可能的，数量竞争产生更大的利润为每个私人企业。我们还将价格-数量选择内生化。在这里，我们发现，伯特兰竞争可能无法成为一个均衡，除非只有一个私人企业。
We revisit the classic discussion comparing price and quantity competition, but in amixed oligopoly in which one state-owned public firm competes against private firms. It has been shown that in a mixed duopoly, price competition yields a larger profit for the private firm. This implies that firms face weaker competition under price competition, which contrasts sharply with the case of a private oligopoly. Here, we adopt a standard differentiated oligopoly with a linear demand. We find that regardless of the number of firms, price competition yields higher welfare. However, the profit ranking depends on the number of private firms. We find that if the number of private firms is greater than or equal to five, it is possible that quantity competition yields a larger profit for each private firm. We also endogenize the price-quantity choice. Here, we find that Bertrand competition can fail to be an equilibrium, unless there is only one private firm.